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2013), when online social networking and microblogging became the most discussed and researched IT-
related topics, along with the Iranian regime’s policies aimed at deterring online expression. This report is
aimed at addressing whether Blogestan itself has faded in size, activity and influence since 2009. We use three
parallel methodologies: An audience survey of 165 Persian blog users from inside and outside of Iran; a web
crawling analysis of the Iranian blogosphere; and a series of interviews with 20 influential bloggers living
outside and inside Iran.
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1Before we published our 2008 Berkman Center study, the Iranian blogosphere was
described by experts as a place where young democrats opposed the regime. Articles,
books, and interviews said this and little more about it. Its size and vitality were
asserted, but as details highlighting a political vision of democratic shoots struggling up
through the (hopefully melting) ice of authoritarianism. Spring was on its way.
Our study did not contradict this story, but the application of network analysis and
statistical clustering to a huge corpus of actual Iranian weblog data showed that the
young democrats were just one part of a larger network that contained many other
kinds of Iranian bloggers. Unexpectedly, we discovered dense networks of conservative
political and religious bloggers every bit as active online as the young democrats (who,
as it turned out, also included a number of older expatriates). In some ways, the side
of the Iranian blogosphere favoring the Iranian regime was more interesting than the
opposition. Within it there were clear subgroups, such as the “CyberShia” who focused
mainly on religion, and others who focused on insider politics from a conservative point
of view. While all of these supported the Supreme Leader, some liked Ahmadinejad and
some hated him. The divisions and arguments among conservatives revealed how Iran
was no run-of-the-mill autocracy, but a hotbed of competing factions each with their
agendas, supporters and advocates.
Beyond politics, there were also large clusters around cultural topics, notably Persian
poetry and literature. The alignment of these clusters in the network showed cultural
divisions that extended beyond overt politics. In Iran, which 14th Century poet you cite
can say a lot about your 21st Century political views. And so the mapping showed that
the division between the opposition and conservatives is not just a division between the
people and a government, but one that ran right down the center of Iranian society.
Since 2008 we have kept an eye on the Iranian blogosphere, remapping it annually and
sometimes around special occasions like the 2009 election. There have been some
important changes, but also important continuity. The changes have resulted mainly
from the efforts of the regime and its allies to influence online communications in
their own favor, by suppressing dissenting voices and promoting friendly ones. The
suppression has taken the form of blocking and forced removal of blogs, as well as
intimidation of critical voices. The second approach has included efforts to flood the
network with Basijis and other pro-regime bloggers. Both of these efforts have met
with only partial success. The pro-regime, particularly CyberShia, sector of the network
has expanded, but it seems mainly to be talking to itself. The opposition component has
been diminished, but is still present and active. To stay online, most of the opposition
bloggers have dropped off the Iranian blog hosts and moved to international ones like
Blogspot and WordPress. This is where the continuity story picks up.
Even though some key regions of Iran’s weblog network grew and others shrank,
overall the structure has remained remarkably similar. On one side of a broad divide
lies opposition politics, literature, poetry, and cultural clusters associated with a mix
of ancient Persian and modern secular traditions. On the other side lies conservative
Foreword by John Kelly
The Iranian Internet Evolution
politics and many strands of religious culture, theology and practice. Beyond these main
groupings are blogs on pop culture, sports, and parenting, similar to the US. Amazingly,
four years after our first map, only 15 percent of the blog URLs in the network were the
same but the structural form was recognizably intact. Like the human body, individual
cells grow and die but the person stays the same.
Lately, we have been mapping other “layers” of Iran’s networked public sphere. Because
of blocking and other restrictions, the growth of Twitter and Facebook has been slow
in Iran. But we have begun to identify significant Persian networks growing in each
platform. This work is just beginning but so far, these networks show a similar divide
between the religious and non-religious, pro-regime and regime critics. Of several
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries we have studied, Iran was the first where
we saw the regime mount a serious effort to shape the online environment by engaging
in it, not just blocking or filtering. Perhaps China began this first, and now it is common
practice in Syria, Russia and elsewhere, but Iran was definitely ahead of the curve. Now
that there has been a political shift in Iran, and some hints that Internet restrictions may
ease, it will be interesting to see how Iran’s networked public sphere evolves further. If
we see a reprise of the original storyline about democratic shoots, it would be nice to
discover that this time Spring is actually on the way.
The Iranian Internet Evolution
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3Summary of Key Findings
between 2002 and 2010, the persian blogosphere—or what is referred to as 
“blogestan”—exploded in size and became the topic of numerous reports, essays, 
videos and books. Global interest in this emerging trend, however, seemed to 
decrease during the second presidential mandate of mahmoud ahmadinejad (2009-
2013), when online social networking and microblogging became the most discussed 
and researched it-related topics, along with the iranian regime’s policies aimed at 
deterring online expression. 
this report is aimed at addressing whether blogestan itself has faded in size, 
activity and influence since 2009. to address these questions, we use three 
parallel methodologies: 
an audience survey of 165 persian blog users from inside and outside of iran;
a web crawling analysis of the iranian blogosphere, based on a list of 24,205  
of the most active and connected persian blogs between 2008 and 2012;
a series of interviews with 20 influential bloggers living inside and outside iran.
the audience survey, the web crawling analysis, and the blogger interviews were 
conducted between July and september 2013.
our research confirms that the persian blogosphere has undergone significant 
shifts since the late 2000s as a result of a confluence of multiple factors: state 
intervention, the rise of social networking sites, changes to iran’s socio-political 
culture, and personal/professional issues. Our study finds that these factors have 
indeed resulted in a general dilution of Blogestan, as indicated by declines in blogging 
activities and the number of active blogs in our sample. Changes to the internal 
dynamics of the Persian blogosphere are also evidenced by shifts in blog content, how 
audiences interact with blogs and bloggers, and blogger-to-blogger relationships.
Specifically, this study finds a decline in overall blogging activity among our survey 
respondents, with nearly half reporting having stopped their activity, in large part 
because of time spent on social media. Our web crawling analysis confirmed this 
high rate of blog abandonment, with only around 20 percent of the prominent blogs 
from 2008-2009 still online in September 2013. In addition, our data shows a general 
decrease in the frequency of posting: 70 percent of bloggers surveyed publish one 
post per month or less—in contrast to earlier years when “if you did not blog for three 
consecutive days, then you would get hundreds of messages asking if you are alright.”1
1 From interview with blogger.
Summary of Key Findings Our analyses indicate that state intervention has played a central role in reshaping
and diffusing Blogestan. In particular, Internet filtering—which began around
2004-2005 and intensified in the post-2009 context—has significantly limited and
modified the diversity of voices in the Persian blogosphere, as well as the activity
and longevity of certain blogs. According to our data, filtering practices vary according
to a blog’s political orientation, web-hosting platform, and political climate. Reformist
blogs are 17 times more likely to be filtered or removed than conservative blogs.
Furthermore, three times the number of reformist blogs in our sample are “deleted” or
“not found” in comparison to conservative blogs. In addition, nearly all blogs hosted on
the only two popular platforms operating outside Iran, WordPress and Blogspot, are
blocked in Iran. According to our analysis, these platforms host a majority of reformist
blogs.
The state’s crackdown on online communications and bloggers produced a myriad
of changes to the Persian blogosphere, according to our analyses. In the early years,
external constraints encouraged the explosion of the blogosphere, as Blogestan
provided a less restrictive environment compared to mainstream media and political
discourse. Growing state pressures on bloggers, and the expansion of legal restrictions
on blogging activities and online communications, however, put both bloggers and the
Persian web in general under intense scrutiny. These conditions drove many prominent
bloggers to alter or cease their blogging activities, while others decided to move to
anonymous blogs, or to emigrate. Bloggers interviewed for this report confirm the
negative impact of the so-called “diaspora effect,” which triggered inherent changes in
the tone of their blogs and attitude both towards Iran and the West, often resulting in a
loss of audience and a decrease or even cessation of their blogging activities.
The growth of social media, and, in particular, social networking sites (SNSs) like
Facebook, is also among the most important causes of the erosion of Blogestan.
Our audience survey shows that although social networking sites are perceived as both
catalyst and impediment for blog usage, these platforms have significantly altered the
way readers interact with blogs. Direct access to the blogs seems to be progressively
replaced by an access via SNSs; the discussion on posts now takes place on SNSs and no
longer via blog comments. Although most readers report a change in how they access
and interact with blogs, nearly all respondents report still reading blogs, and according
to our analysis, there is no detectable pattern of decline in blog consumption. However,
the majority of the survey respondents started to read blogs at least four years ago: one
may ask if there is any replenishment of the blog reader base or if Blogestan relies on a
legacy readership.
Bloggers we interviewed generally agree that the increase in SNSs and link-sharing
sites have had a negative impact on Blogestan, as these platforms offer both users
and bloggers faster and more efficient modes of activity and participation. SNSs
facilitate publication and instant promotion of any content, including short, often less
analytical, and re-used content. They also provide a consistent, seamless and crossplatform
experience for readers. The rise in SNS usage has not only significantly
affected how and what types of blog content is produced and promoted, but also
has fundamentally altered the nature of blogger-to-blogger and blogger-to-audience
relationships within the Persian blogosphere. For instance, although the popular social
networking and link-sharing site Balatarin is widely used to promote blog posts and
to assess their impact, bloggers complain that it has also caused a “Balatarinization
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5of Blogestan,” which favors provocative, radical, and extreme content over the more 
thoughtful intellectual conversations that attracted many readers to early Blogestan. 
Over time, most bloggers migrated to social networking sites to promote their blogs 
and instantly reach their audiences. Although this parallel use of SNSs and blogs 
helped some bloggers be efficient and responsive, most agree that the consequence of 
this platform migration is that social media are becoming the de facto owners of blog 
content, of discussion on posts, and by extension, of blogger-to-blogger and blogger-
to-audience interactions. additionally the flood of content produced by thousands 
of snss users meant bloggers’ unique social status was impacted, and their 
contributions more easily lost in a sea of other contributions. 
At the same time, bloggers we interviewed report that the closure of popular services 
such as BlogRolling in 2010 and Google Reader in 2013 disrupted important connections 
between bloggers, hindering a key dimension of the dynamics of Blogestan. For 
instance, the feed aggregator Google Reader—nicknamed “Gooder” by Persian users—
allowed audiences to follow numerous blogs efficiently while circumventing the 
censorship of filtered blogs.
Initially an unrestricted platform for a range of voices—including journalists and social 
activists—Blogestan grew increasingly more politicized as a result of changes to Iran’s 
socio-political culture and the increase in reformist and pro-democratic discourse. 
These socio-political changes in Iranian society led many bloggers to abandon the 
initial “personal diary” approach in favor of socio-political analysis and op-ed style 
commentary. This trend, emphasized by many of our interviewed bloggers, is also 
highlighted by our audience survey: the portion of blog readers interested in “personal 
interests and hobbies” has dramatically decreased, while more and more readers want 
to read about news, leading many bloggers to address more political topics that possibly 
were not their first preferences, and, in turn, reducing their incentive to blog. 
Beyond these factors, bloggers we interviewed also cite financial and professional 
reasons for a decline in their own blogging activities. For instance, bloggers report 
that they reduced their blogging activities when they left university and began their 
professional lives, because blogging could not offer financial stability and because 
blogging might cause some risks to their new careers.
Summary of Key Findings
6Introduction
during the first decade of 2000, a significant number of reports, essays, videos, 
and books depicted and analyzed one of the most exciting trends of the so-called 
Web 2.0: the persian language blogosphere, or blogestan (literally: “province of the 
blogs”). From 2002 onward, internet users from around the world were empowered 
with user-friendly and affordable tools allowing them to be creators and not 
just consumers of online information. With tens of thousands of active persian 
blogs—and with persian reportedly being the third most-popular language on the 
internet2—blogestan was seen by many as one of the most promising internet 
grassroots movements.
this report attempts to understand the state of blogestan in 2013 and how it has 
evolved since Western expectations for the persian blogosphere began to deflate 
in the late 2000s. in so doing, it is necessary to first review the main narratives on 
blogestan in order to demonstrate how perceptions of the persian blogosphere have 
developed over the past decade.
iranian blogosphere and the emancipatory 
narrative
The first significant publication about Persian blogs, We are Iran: The Persian Blogs, 
presented blogs as a safe haven for young, urban bloggers who espoused secular, pro-
human rights, and democratic ideals, with aspirations for more freedom of thought 
and speech, and an inclination for a modern, even “Western” way of life.3 This rich but 
distorted picture both reflected and corroborated Western narratives about the Persian 
blogosphere,4 in which blogs were seen as the best hope for freedom and democracy 
in Iran: “If the commentaries by young Iranian bloggers are anything to go by, it seems 
that ideals have replaced ideology. They want accountability, pluralism and democracy 
and have shed the dogmatic ideologies of the past.”5 
Various studies reinforced this perception of Iranian bloggers. Babak Rahimi highlighted 
the key role of the “20,000 active internet sites and weblogs [as] an alternative medium 
for expression that is denied to [young Iranian and especially women] in real public.”6 
Vancouver-based researcher Jordan Halevi (an online alias) asserted that most readers 
2 This ranking is often 
quoted and is based 
on December 2003 
figures from the NITLE 
Blog Census website: 
http://web.archive.org/
web/20031202022722/
http://www.blogcensus.
net/?page=lang. In late 
2006 Technocrati only 
ranked Persian as the 10th 
most used language on 
blogs: http://www.sifry.com/
alerts/archives/000443.
html.
3 Nasrin Alavi, We are Iran: 
The Persian Blogs (Brooklyn 
NY: Soft Skull Press, 2005).
4 This perspective had 
already been presented 
by several Western 
media outlets. See Alfred 
Hermida, “Web Gives a 
Voice to Iranian Women,” 
BBC News, 17 June 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/sci/tech/2044802.stm; 
and Michelle Delio, “Blogs 
Opening Iranian Society?” 
Wired, 28 May 2003, 
http://www.wired.com/
culture/lifestyle/news/2003/
05/58976?currentPage=all.
5 Alavi, 318.
6 Babak Rahimi, 
“Cyberdissent: The Internet 
in Revolutionary Iran,” 
Middle East Review of 
International Affairs, 7.3 
(2003), 4.
7of Persian-language blogs at the time were young urban university students who openly 
opposed the regime’s policy of web censorship, while noting that these readers also held 
“a wide array of views on religion.”7
In 2008, a short animated film, “A Nation of Bloggers,” described the blog movement 
in Iran as “a revolution within the revolution,” and emphasized the reformist political 
message many young Iranians voiced through their blogs.8 This idealistic vision became 
entrenched among Western policy makers, scholars and journalists—particularly 
as international relations intensified during Ahmadinejad’s first presidential term 
(2005-2009).
Australian journalist Antony Loewenstein described how the socio-political culture in 
Iran forced citizens to develop public personalities distinct from their private lives, and 
how blogs give Iranians space to more freely express their private personalities.9 While 
acknowledging the diversity of Blogestan—mentioning the religious leaders trained 
in Qom or pro-Ahmadinejad bloggers—Loewenstein portrayed Iranian bloggers as 
primarily young, educated, urban, middle or upper class, and unwilling to follow the 
society’s strict rules: “Iran’s online community is providing the strongest indication yet 
of how a predominantly young population under thirty wants to articulate an alternative 
Iranian identity.”10
blogestan’s complexity: a shift in narrative
Meanwhile, more meticulous observers were presenting a less monolithic image of 
Blogestan, which reflected a much wider and dynamic socio-political spectrum than 
mainstream depictions. Fred Petrossian analyzed a cluster of pro-Islamic Republic 
Hezbollah blogs that focused not only on political issues but also on poetry, religion and 
other topics.11 He also studied several anti-Semitic blogs, showing that anti-Semitism 
is a dynamic movement in Iran, combining traditional/religious, and domestic/Western 
elements.12
Additional studies attempted to analyze and quantify Blogestan in more systematic 
ways. Tehran-based Iran Civil Society Organization Training and Research Center 
(ICTRC) found a significant presence of blogs focused on religion, poetry and literature.13 
In 2008, blogger Arash Kamangir (author Arash Abadpour’s online alias) launched 
“Didish” (“Have you seen it?”), a weekly analysis of trends and topics being discussed in 
7 Fred Petrossian, 
“Interview with Jordan 
Halevi, a Canadian 
Researcher on Iranian 
Blogs,” Global Voices, 7 
November 2006,  
http://globalvoicesonline.
org/2006/11/07/interview-
with-jordan-halevi-
acanadian-researcher-on-
iranian-blogs/.
8 Vancouver Film School 
(VFS), “IRAN: A Nation of 
Bloggers,” 2008, http://
vimeo.com/2139754.
9 Antony Loewenstein, 
The Blogging Revolution 
(Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Publishing, 
2009).
10 Loewenstein, 56.
11 Fred Petrossian, 
“Hezbollah Goes 
Blogging,” Global Voices, 
12 December 2005, 
http://globalvoicesonline.
org/2005/12/12/iranian-
hezbollah-goes-blogging/.
12 Fred Petrossian, (under 
the pen name Hamid 
Tehrani), “Iranian anti-
Semitic Bloggers: From 
Mickey Mouse’s Plot to 
Gaddafi’s Jewishness,” 
History News Network 
(HNN), George Mason 
University, 2008, http://
www.hnn.us/article/50535#.
13 Iran Civil Society 
Organization Training and 
Research Center (ICTRC), 
“Persian Blogosphere 
Crawler Report,” 2006. 
This report found some 
150,000 Persian blogs 
and a domination of five 
weblog farms (Blogfa, 
Persianblog, Mihanblog, 
BlogSky, Parsiblog and 
Blogspot). It also showed 
that although the overall 
filtering ratio was very low 
(around 1 percent), filtering 
increased according to the 
popularity of blogs and 
differed according to the 
blog-hosting platforms.
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8the Persian blogosphere.14 Although Didish was not regularly maintained, the original 
data were based on social aggregators that showed how blogs were competing against 
other sources of news and information (such as Radio Zamaneh or BBC Persian). 
The mainstream narrative was most successfully challenged by the hallmark study 
“Mapping Iran’s Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Persian Blogosphere,”15 which 
used computational social network mapping in combination with human and automated 
content analysis to demonstrate that the approximately 60,000 routinely updated 
Persian blogs covered “a wide range of opinions representing religious conservative 
points of view as well as secular and reform-minded ones, and topics ranging from 
politics and human rights to poetry, religion, and pop culture.”16 Apart from depicting 
the complex connections between the different network formations, or clusters 
(“secular/reformist,” “conservative/religious,” “Persian poetry and literature,” and “mixed 
networks”), the study also showed that a surprisingly small portion of reformist bloggers 
actually blogged anonymously, and that less than 17 percent of the oppositional blogs 
(“secular/reformist” cluster) were blocked inside Iran.17 
Blogistan: The Internet and Politics of Iran18 also recognized the complexity and diversity 
of the Iranian blogosphere, noting that “far from being an undifferentiated ‘mass,’ 
bloggers and their ‘politics’ assume a range of broad orientations with different aims, 
content, forms of expression and connections to various networks, many of them 
contradictory and even hostile to one another.”19 Likewise, journalist Cyrus Farivar 
asserted that “what has been happening in Iran during the two decades since the 
Internet first arrived is far more interesting than the simple narrative of a young wired 
generation throwing off the yoke of an oppressive regime.”20
Furthermore, Evgeny Morozov claimed that far from being the powerful tools for 
democratic debate, the Internet in general—and blogs and social media in particular—
have been utilized by authoritarian powers for anti-democratic purposes, such as 
for gathering intelligence on citizens.21 In the case of Iran, Morozov warned against 
equating “blogging to samizdat and bloggers with dissidents” as “there are plenty of  
pro-government blogs in Iran,”22 some with even more conservative views than those  
of the authorities themselves.23 
14 Arash Kamangir, 
“Statistics of the Persian 
Blogosphere, Project 
‘Didish,’” 2008.
15 John Kelly and Bruce 
Etling, “Mapping Iran’s 
Online Public: Politics and 
Culture in the Persian 
Blogosphere,” Havard 
University: Berkman  
Center for Internet  
and Society, 2008,  
http://cyber.law.harvard.
edu/publications/2008/
Mapping_Irans_Online_
Public.
16 Kelly and Etling, 2.
17 For information on the 
blocking of opposition 
blogs, Kelly and Etling 
relied on data from the 
OpenNet Initiative, which 
analyzed blocking patterns 
from a sample of 1,800 
blogs.
18 Annabelle Sreberny and 
Gholam Khiabany, Blogistan: 
The Internet and Politics of 
Iran (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2010).
19 Sreberny and Khiabany, 
39.
20 Cyrus Farivar, Internet 
of Elsewhere: The Emergent 
Effects of a Wired World 
(New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 
2011).
21 Evgeny Morozov, The 
Net Delusion: The Dark 
Side of Internet Freedom 
(New York: Public Affairs, 
2011). See also Arman 
Nafisi’s analysis of 153 
blogs, which concluded 
that the notion that blogs 
promote democratic 
ideals and political reform 
in Iran lacks sufficient 
evidence, “Blogging outside 
Iran: A Tool for Internal 
Democratic Change?” 
Honors Thesis, University 
of Washington, 2008, 
http://ccce.com.washington.
edu/projects/assets/Nafisi_
Blogging_Outside_Iran.pdf.
22 Morozov, 46.
23 A series of reports by  
the Small Media Foundation 
(2013) also focused on 
conservative bloggers. 
See Small Media’s “Iranian 
conservative bloggers” 
pieces at http://storify.com/
smallmedia/.
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9blogestan and state influence
In the post-2009 context in particular, more researchers paid closer attention to the 
negative impacts of state interference over the Internet, including the expansion of 
technological and regulatory restrictions over online communications.24 The OpenNet 
Initiative’s (ONI) series of monitoring reports of the state’s filtering practices have 
provided key documentation of the evolution of technological and policy-based 
restrictions in terms of access to online media and blogs, and blog-hosting platforms 
within Iran.25 For instance, the program’s 2006-2007 report found that at the time  
a substantial number of individual blogs hosted on Blogspot were filtered—including 
blogs related to religion, women’s rights, political reform, and reproductive health—
while few blogs were filtered on Iranian platforms like Blogfa and Persianblog.26 
Likewise, Small Media Foundation also examined Iran’s more recent filtering policies 
and found that authorities use a mix of “traditional” techniques (“black lists” of 
domains, keywords in URL and IP addresses) with more advanced methods (deep packet 
inspection, bandwidth throttling, alleged “smart control” of social networking sites, and 
filtering of VPNs and other circumvention tools).27 These practices have had a strong 
impact on blogs and blog-hosting platforms on Blogfa and other Iran-based services, 
according to the organization.
At the same time, human rights groups and media monitoring NGOs, including Reporters 
Without Borders, the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, Freedom House and 
Article 19 have raised international attention around the upsurge in detentions and 
imprisonment of journalists and bloggers, especially since 2009.28 According to Freedom 
House, “since June 2009, the authorities have cracked down on online activism through 
various forms of judicial and extra-legal intimidation. An increasing number of bloggers 
have been threatened, arrested, tortured, kept in solitary confinement, and denied 
medical care, while others have been formally tried and convicted. At least 50 bloggers 
and online activists were arrested in 2009 and 2010.”29 
24 “Internet Censorship 
in Iran: An Infographic,” 
Iran Media Program 
(IMP), Center for Global 
Communication Studies, 
Annenberg School for 
Communication, University 
of Pennsylvania, http://
iranmediaresearch.org/en/
research/pdffile/1296.
25 OpenNet Initiative’s 
reports on Iranian filtering 
and Internet censorship 
policies include: “Internet 
Filtering in Iran in 2006-
2007,” 2007, https://
opennet.net/studies/
iran2007; “Internet 
Filtering in Iran,” 16 June 
2009, https://opennet.
net/research/profiles/iran; 
“After the Green Movement: 
Internet Controls in Iran,” 
15 February 2013. www.
opennet.net/iranreport2013.
26 OpenNet Initiative, 2007.
27 Small Media Foundation, 
“Iranian Internet 
Infrastructure and Policy 
Report,” Election Edition, 
2013, http://smallmedia.org.
uk/IIIPJune.pdf.
28 Reporters Without 
Borders, “Enemies of the 
Internet,” Annual Reports, 
http://surveillance.rsf.org/
en/iran/; Iran Human Rights 
Documentation Center, 
“CTRL+ALT+Delete: Iran’s 
Response to the Internet,” 
2009, http://www.iranhrdc.
org/english/publications/
reports/3157-ctrl-alt-delete-
iran-039-s-response-
to-the-internet.html#.
Ul0OgniEV2M; Article 19, 
Azad Tribune, 2009-2014, 
http://www.article19.org/
en/azad/; Freedom House, 
“Freedom on the Net 
2012: A Global Assessment 
of Internet and Digital 
Media,” 2012, http://www.
freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-net/freedom-
net-2012.
29 Freedom House, 273.
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blogestan and social networking sites
Another recent focus of scholarship relates to the impacts of new technologies on 
the Persian blogophere. As highlighted by Sreberny and Khiabany: “[...] rather than 
targeting a large audience, [blogs] are indeed written for the benefit of other bloggers 
and ‘communities of interests’.”30 If, as these authors suggest, blogging has always 
been more a conversation than a traditional medium like broadcasting, this would 
partly explain why many bloggers brought their “conversations” to social networking 
sites, where the audience is structurally limited to one’s own network (“friends,” “fans,” 
“followers,” etc.). 
Social networking and microblogging sites have also contributed to the decline of blogs 
as a space for political debate, according to some researchers. Using a short survey of 
Iranian bloggers and media professionals from across the political spectrum, Petrossian 
confirmed the growing influence of Facebook as a central platform for obtaining and 
discussing information. Still, survey respondents said that blogs are irreplaceable, 
particularly for political and civil society activities.31 
In a 2013 study defining archetypes of Iranian Internet users, Arash Abadpour and 
Collin Anderson concluded that blogging still plays a significant role for a portion of 
Internet users.32 Likewise, researcher Klara Debeljak’s 2013 survey of more than 1,000 
respondents in Iran showed that 36 percent of respondents use the Internet and 
14 percent use blogs as sources for news and information.33 This corroborates Iran 
Media Program’s earlier survey on media consumption habits among Iranians, in which 
26 percent of the general population and nearly 90 percent of younger, tech savvy 
respondents reported turning to the Internet first to access news and information.34
30 Sreberny and Khiabany, 
41.
31 Fred Petrossian, “Iran: 
Has Blogging Become Less 
Popular Since the Election?” 
Global Voices, 14 April 2010, 
http://globalvoicesonline.
org/2010/04/14/iran-has-
blogging-become-less-
popular-since-the-election/.
32 Arash Abadpour and 
Collin Anderson, “Fights, 
Adapts, Accepts: Archetypes 
of Iranian Internet Use,” 
Iran Media Program, Center 
for Global Communication 
Studies, Annenberg School 
for Communication, 
University of Pennsylvania, 
March 2013, http://www.
iranmediaresearch.org/
en/research/pdffile/1287. 
Among other archetypes, 
the authors listed five types 
of Iranian bloggers:  
the civil society blogger, 
the dissident blogger,  
the lowprofile blogger, the 
IT blogger, and the famous 
blogger.
33 Kalara Debeljak, “Youth 
in Iran: A Story Half 
Told,” InterMedia and 
Small Media Foundation, 
May 2013, http://www.
intermedia.org/youth-in-
iran-a-story-half-told/.
34 Magdalena Wojcieszak, 
Briar Smith and Mahmood 
Enayat, “Finding A Way: 
How Iranians Reach for 
News and Information,” 
Iran Media Program, 
Center for Global 
Communication Studies, 
Annenberg School for 
Communication, University 
of Pennsylvania, 2011-2012, 
(see page 11 and 27 for 
cited data), http://www.
iranmediaresearch.org/
sites/default/files/research/
pdf/1340899786/944/
finding_a_way.pdf.pdf.
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the recurrent Question of the size of blogestan
Many observers have attempted to define Blogestan and its evolution by simply 
measuring its size—an appealing approach because of its simplicity and objectivity. Yet 
quantifying the Persian blogosphere has proven less straightforward than anticipated 
and has produced inconsistent results, as such measurements first require determining 
the content and boundaries of Blogestan. For instance, limiting the analysis to Persian-
language blogs excludes other languages Iranians use for blogging (English, French, 
Urdu, Arabic, Turkic-Azeri, Kurdish), and includes bloggers using Persian language who 
are not from Iran or part of the Iranian diaspora (such as Afghani, Azerbaijani, and Tajik).
Likewise, limiting the data to the “.ir” top-level domain is also not useful, as “.ir” domains 
are not always used for blogs, particularly because of state-imposed restrictions. Many 
bloggers use Persian-dedicated blog farms like Blogfa, Persianblog, and Parsiblog. 
Moreover, there is no real consensus on the definition of a blog: Is a blog single 
authored? Must it follow a simple layout and be organized in reverse-chronological 
order? Does it need to include a blogroll, an archive of posts, or an RSS feed? Does it 
need to allow user comments? Lastly, as noted by Bruce Arnold from Caslon Analytics, 
“several studies indicate that 60 percent to 80 percent of blogs are abandoned soon 
after their creation.”35 The question of whether a blog can be considered active is 
therefore key to obtaining an accurate count of the number of blogs. Again there is little 
consensus on what can be considered an “active” blog.
Due to the vague definitions of “Blogestan,” “blog,” “active blog,” as well as the difficulty 
in turning these definitions into algorithms for large data collection, the results of the 
numerous attempts to measure the size of Blogestan have varied widely. Although 
researchers have used other methodologies to conceptualize, demarcate and analyze 
“national webs” and their features,37 these new standardized methods have not been 
used regularly and systematically enough over time to offer a sufficient relevant 
benchmark to study the evolution of the Persian blogosphere.
number of persian blogs  
over the years, according  
to various sources
13,000 blogs  
(BBC Persian, 2003)
52,000 blogs  
(NITLE Blog Census, 2003)36
85,000 blogs  
(Alavi, 2005)
400,000 blogs  
(ONI, 2007)
700,000 blogs,  
including 100,000 active  
(“A Nation of Bloggers,” 2008)
200,000 blogs, including 
60,000 routinely updated  
(Kelly & Etling, 2008)
70,000 active blogs  
(Sreberny & Khiabany, 2010)
60,000 to 100,000  
(Farivar, 2011) 
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35 Caslon Analytics 
Blogging, “Blog Statistics 
and Demographics,” 
February 2009,  
http://www.caslon.com.au/
weblogprofile1.htm.
36 The National Institute 
for Technology in Liberal 
Education (NITLE) Blog 
Census, (no longer 
functional, information can 
be accessed at: 
http://web.archive.org/
web/20031202022722/
http://www.blogcensus.
net/?page=lang.)
37 Richard Rogers, et al. 
“National Web Studies: 
Mapping Iran Online,” Iran 
Media Program/Digital 
Methods Initiative, 2012, 
https://mappingiranonline.
digitalmethods.net/.
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Methodology and Sample Information
this report presents the results of a comparison of three qualitative and 
quantitative sets of data in order to achieve a more comprehensive analysis  
of the development and status of the persian blogosphere.38 
Our analysis is derived from:
An audience survey of 165 blog readers, focusing on blog consumption habits and 
how these have developed over time. The 27-question survey was created on Google 
Forms and distributed to a network of bloggers via email, Facebook, Twitter, Google+. 
As further detailed in the Methodology of the Audience Survey (see Annex p.40), we 
cannot assess to what extent this sample is representative of the readers of Persian 
blogs. However, our sample includes a range of respondents in terms of gender, age, 
educational background, and residence (from both inside and outside Iran).
A web crawling analysis: To complement the quantitative data of the audience survey, 
we used automated web crawling techniques to assess the connection between factors 
such as filtering, political orientation, and hosting platform on the evolution of Persian 
blogs over time. Our crawling analysis was based on the data from the 2008 “Mapping 
Iran’s Online Public” and on the annual updates of this dataset aggregated by data 
analysis company, Morningside Analytics through 2012. We also ran an extra data 
collection and analysis in order to gather information on the status and levels of activity 
of each blog, as well as on filtering and/or removal occurrences. Every blog from each 
annual sample was attached to a topical category (or “attentive cluster”)—“reformist,” 
“conservative, or “other”39—using human examination and a computational analysis of 
the frequencies of words and phrases.
A series of interviews with 20 bloggers who have been active members of Blogestan 
sometime during the past ten year period.40 Bloggers were selected on the basis of their 
personal experience with blogging as well as their knowledge of Blogestan in general. 
38 For more detail about 
the methodology of all 
three data sets, see Annex.
39 The “other” cluster 
includes Persian poetry 
and literature, and mixed 
networks.
40 Interviews were 
conducted between June 
20 and September 12, 2013 
over email, Skype, 
or Google Chat,  
depending on the bloggers’ 
preferences and security 
requirements.
• A majority of respondents in 
our audience survey sample are 
younger than 30 years of age. 
• Roughly two-thirds  
(66 percent) are male and  
the remainder are female.
• Most are educated, holding  
at least a bachelor’s degree.
• Approximately two thirds  
(63 percent) of respondents  
live inside Iran.
• Our web crawling dataset 
consists of 24,205 blogs.
• The sample is dominated by 
Blogfa, which represents nearly  
70 percent of the total  
24,205 blogs.
• Because of the methodology 
used to select these active and 
prominent blogs, the size of 
sample differs by and ranges 
between 6,061 blogs to 9,121.
 
• Eleven respondents lived 
in Iran and nine had left the 
country since they started 
blogging.
• Eleven of the interviewed 
bloggers were female  
and nine were male.
• Seventeen were currently 
bloggers and three had stopped 
blogging for different reasons.
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Key Findings from the Audience 
Survey
this study finds that the persian blogosphere has experienced significant shifts 
and patterns of decline since the late 2000s as a result of a combination of: state 
influence—specifically increased filtering and direct pressure on bloggers; the rise of 
social networking sites; changes to socio-political conditions in iran; and personal/
professional reasons.
results from each of the three datasets used in this study are presented below. 
a Legacy readership
nine out of ten of respondents began reading blogs at least four years ago. While 
this may indicate that blogestan’s readership has a strong pre-2009 legacy, the 
question remains as to whether the new generation continues to read blogs or if they 
skip directly to other social media like Facebook, Balatarin, Twitter etc.
FiGure 1. FirST eNCOuNTer WiTH BLOGS
ABOUT 1 YEAR AGO
ABOUT 2 YEARS AGO
ABOUT 3 YEARS AGO
ABOUT 4 YEARS AGO
MORE THAN 5 YEARS AGO
75.5%
ABOUT 5 YEARS AGO
8.2%
  2.5%
6.3%
5.7%
6.3%
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still reading blogs
nearly all respondents (99 percent) report they still read blogs and a solid majority 
do so several times a week or more.
FiGure 2. FrequeNCy OF reAdiNG BLOGS
evolution of reading habits: no clear  
Quantitative pattern
The vast majority of respondents (92 percent) report a change in their blog reading 
habits between the time they started to read blogs and the summer of 2013. However, 
there is no quantitative trend in terms of modification of time spent on blogs, number  
of blogs followed, or frequency of visits. This suggests that the change in reading habits 
is qualitative rather than quantitative.
FiGure 3. CHANGeS iN BLOG reAdiNG HABiTS
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TIME SPENT ON BLOGS
NUMBER OF BLOGS READ
FREQUENCY OF VISITING BLOGS
17.0%DECREASE
71.5%NO CHANGE
11.5%INCREASE
19.4%
49.7%
30.9%
18.8%
62.4%
18.8%
NO REPLYSEVERAL TIMES A DAY
ABOUT ONCE A WEEK
10.9%EVERY DAY
34.5%
22.4%
SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK
BUT NOT EVERY DAY
22.4%
3%
1.8%
3.6%
1.2%
ABOUT ONCE A MONTH
LESS THAN ONCE A MONTH
ABOUT EVERY TWO WEEKS
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social media both catalyst and impediment  
to blog consumption
respondents overwhelmingly chose social media as the primary reason for both  
an increase and decrease in their blog reading activities. Additional reasons cited by 
respondents for a decline in blog use are a decrease in blog activity, decreased interest 
in blog posts, decline in the general number of blogs, filtering, and personal reasons, 
respectively. After social media, the top reason respondents cite for increased blog 
reading is longer time spent online. 
FiGure 4. reASONS FOr CHANGe iN BLOG reAdiNG HABiTS
Key Findings from
the Audience Survey
BLOGS ARE NOT POLITICIZED ENOUGH
LESS BLOGS
FILTERING OF BLOGS 
PERSONAL REASONS
TIME SPENT ONLINE
INTEREST OF POSTS
ACTIVITY OF BLOGS
MORE TIME SPENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA
28.5%
8.5%
11.5%
21.8%
4.2%
30.9%
26.1%
18.2%
7.9%
10.3%
12.7%
10.3%
1.2%
REASONS
FOR DECREASING
BLOG READING
REASONS
FOR INCREASING
BLOG READING
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evolution of readers’ preferences
Survey participants cite decreasing interest in personal topics (everyday life, interests 
and hobbies, other people’s opinion and experience) as well as in topics with social and 
cultural themes. In contrast, respondents report increased interest in news consumption 
(domestic news, foreign affairs, economics), as well as for information that could 
improve their situation in difficult economic times (education, life abroad, IT/science).
FiGure 5. reASONS TO reAd BLOGS, iNiTiALLy ANd NOW
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OTHER
TRAVEL / LIFE ABROAD
PEOPLE'S DAILY LIVES
NEWS
LEARNING FROM PEOPLE'S EXPERIENCES
EDUCATION
PEOPLE'S OPINION
INTEREST / HOBBY
56.4%
55.8%
26.1%
40.0%
35.2%
29.7%
38.8%
30.3%
24.2%
6.1%
27.3%
15.8%
10.3%
43.0%
45.5%
38.8%
INITIALLY
IN 2013
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Key Findings from
the Audience Survey FiGure 6. TOPiCS mOST OFTeN reAd ON BLOGS
COMMUNITY ISSUES
ECONOMY
ENVIRONMENT
RELIGION 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EVERYDAY LIFE
CULTURAL
IRAN NEWS
SCIENCE / TECH / IT SPORTS
WOMEN'S RIGHTS JOKES, FUN
HEALTH
OTHER
LITERATURE
LIFESTYLE
SCHOOL OR PROFESSIONAL ISSUES
SOCIAL
70.3%
60.0%
69.1%
50.3%
68.5%
55.8%
62.4%
68.5%
46.7%
52.7%
43.0%
38.8%
35.2%
35.8%
35.2%
28.5%
34.5%
44.2%
33.9%
32.7%
30.9%
24.2%
29.1%
38.2%
22.4%
22.4%
20.6%
26.7%
20.0%
12.1%
12.1%
18.2%
3.6%
2.4%
2.4%
INITIALLY
IN 2013
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Access via Social Networks Progressively 
Replacing Direct Access to Blogs
Respondents conﬁrm the growing prominence of social networking and link-sharing 
sites as a means of accessing blogs: a majority report they no longer access blogs 
directly but instead do so through various social media and link-sharing platforms. 
FIGURE 7. USE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING AND LIN HARING SITES TO ACCESS BLOGS
Comments on Social Networks More Frequent 
than on Blogs
although they still post comments on individual blogs.
FIGURE 8. FREQUENCY OF COMMENTING ON BLOGS BY PLATFO
41.8%
47.3%
16.4%
58.5%
51.5%
14.5%
30.6%
68.2%
RSS
LINK SHARING
DIRECTLY TO BLOGS
SOCIAL NETWORKING
INITIALLY
IN 2013
AROUND ONCE A MONTH
AROUND TWICE A MONTH
AROUND ONCE A WEEK
3 TO 5 TIMES A WEEK
ONCE A DAY
MORE THAN ONCE A DAY
3.0%
4.2%
9.7%
6.7%
3.6%
6.7%
9.1%
5.5%
1.8%
14.5%
7.9%
5.5%
10.3%
2.4%
4.8%
15.8%
4.2%
1.8%
FACEBOOK
GOOGLE+
BLOGS
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most blog readers are also bloggers  
but many have stopped their blogging activity
Our data corroborates prior research indicating that there is a significant overlap 
between readers of blogs and active bloggers.41 A strong majority of respondents in our 
sample currently write or have written a blog in addition to being an active blog reader. 
Yet according to our data, more than a third of these respondents have stopped their 
blogging activity.
FiGure 9. BLOGGiNG ACTiviTy AmONG reAderS
NEVER BLOGGED
STILL BLOGGING
45.1%
STOPPED BLOGGING
37.0%
17.9%
41 Sreberny and Khiabany, 41.
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a slow publication pace
Among our subset of readers who are also bloggers, the rate of publication on active 
blogs is relatively low. Nearly 60 percent publish a post only once a month, or even less 
frequently.
20
Reasons to Start Blogging / Reasons to Stop 
Blogging
Interestingly, there is signiﬁcant overlap among our subset of readers who are also 
bloggers in terms of the reasons they cite for both starting and stopping blogging 
activities. According to our data, “personal satisfaction”/“personal reasons” are the main 
reasons survey respondents give for beginning as well as abandoning a blog. “Saying 
things that cannot be said in public” and “sharing news not covered by mass media,” 
are cited as important reasons for starting a blog, while “fear of censorship” and “too 
many blogs ﬁltered,” are the key reasons for no longer blogging. One crucial reason for 
stopping blogging is the increase in time spent on other social media platforms.
Key Findings from
the Audience Survey
1.8%
27.3%
21.8%
8.5%
5.5%
4.8%
3.6%
BLOGS ARE TOO POLITICIZED
OTHER
TOO MANY BLOGS FILTERED
LESS TIME ONLINE
FEAR OF CENSORSHIP
TOO MUCH TIME ON SOCIAL MEDIA
PERSONAL REASONS
3%
9.1%
52.7%
35.2%
32.7%
24.2%
21.2%
10.9%
OTHERS
BECOMING A PUBLIC FIGURE
WAY TO FILL TIME / HOBBY
RAISING AWARENESS ON A PARTICULAR TOPIC
SHARING NEWS NOT COVERED BY MASS MEDIA
TALKING ABOUT DAILY LIFE
SAYING THINGS THAT CAN'T BE SAID IN PUBLIC
PERSONAL SATISFACTION
FIGURE 10. REASONS FOR STARTING A BLOG FIGURE 11. REASONS FOR STOPPING 
BLOGGING
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Key Findings from
the Audience Survey a divergence in blog content and reader 
preference
Our data show that blog topics recently addressed by our subset of blog readers who 
also blog focus mainly on personal concerns (daily life, lifestyle) and socio-cultural 
issues—topics in which the readers in our sample also report having less interest. 
Conversely, topics that readers cite having been more interested in over the years 
(domestic news, foreign affairs, science/IT, economics) are for the most part not often 
covered by our subset of bloggers. This suggests a divergence between readers’ current 
interests and the topics that are actually addressed by bloggers.
FiGure 12. reCeNT BLOG TOPiCS
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As noted in the previous methodology section, our crawling analysis is based on
datasets of 24,205 blogs from the 2008 Persian Blogosphere project,42 and on
annual updates of this dataset aggregated by Morningside Analytics through 2012.
We also conducted additional analyses on the status and level of activity of each
blog, as well as any filtering or removal occurrences, according to assigned clusters
of the blog’s political orientation (“reformist,” “conservative,” or “other”).43
According to our findings:
There are notable differences in the frequency of filtering and removals between
different blog hosts and political affiliation clusters. The two platforms based outside
Iran—Blogspot (often called “Blogger” after being purchased by Google in 2003) and
WordPress—appear to be almost entirely filtered in Iran (98 percent and 96 percent,
respectively). This not entirely complete level of filtering is due to the fact that although
the filtering system in Iran uniformly blocks Blogspot and WordPress, exceptions are
explicitly formulated in a so-called “white list” allowing access to specific sites.
A review of the 2 percent of Blogspot and 4 percent of WordPress blogs from our
dataset that are not blocked and were still active in September 2013 shows that none
include reformist content and half are explicitly pro-regime or contain hardline religious
content.44
Furthermore, our research shows that Blogspot and WordPress attract almost no
conservative blogs (1 percent and 4 percent respectively) and host a majority of
reformist blogs (51 percent and 78 percent respectively). In contrast, Parsiblog attracts
predominantly conservative (96 percent) and almost no reformist blogs (1 percent).
Lastly, removals due to violations of the law or terms-of-service agreements are rather
limited on platforms operated from inside Iran (4 percent or below) and never occur
on Blogspot and WordPress, which is understandable as platforms outside Iran are not
required to comply with Iranian laws and policies.45 Removals are enforced on Iranian
platforms regardless of the location of their servers.46
42 Kelly and Etling, 2008.
43 Each blog in the annual
samples was assigned
a topical category (or
attentive clusters) using
human examination and a
computational analysis of
the frequencies of words
and phrases. See more on
Web Crawling methodology
in Part on methodology and
sample information.
44 See, for example:
http://basijnetwork.
blogspot.com and http://
ahestan.WordPress.com/.
45 For more detailed data
on removals by Iranian and
non-Iranian platforms, see
Part 2 on methodology and
sample information.
46 Any entity—
persons, companies, or
infrastructure—that could
fall within the jurisdiction
of Iran can be defined as
an “Iranian platform.”
While most Persian
blogging platforms are
hosted outside of the
country, their owners are
either inside or beholden
to the government in some
way. Hence, WordPress
would not fall within this
domain; however, Blogfa
would. Even though Blogfa
is incorporated and hosted
outside Iran, its founder
lives in Iran.
Key Findings of Web Crawling
Analysis
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the number of reformist blogs that are filtered or removed is 17 times greater than  
that of conservative blogs. We also cross-referenced the information between 
clusters and filtering/removal for violations of the law or terms-of-service agreements. 
Our analyses shows that reformist blogs are more often filtered or removed than 
conservative ones: nearly half of reformists blogs in our data set have been filtered or 
removed, compared to just 2.8 percent of conservative blogs. We also observe that most 
blogs that were taken down at some point are still technically filtered, which suggests 
that they were first filtered by the authorities and subsequently removed.
FiGure 13. FiLTeriNG ANd remOvAL By CLuSTer AFFiLiATiON
three times the number of reformist blogs have been “deleted” or are “not found” 
compared to conservative blogs. We analyzed the error messages generated by the 
hosting platform and coded these errors as “deleted” (when the blog was deleted and it 
is not specified if it was deleted by the platform or by the user) and “not found” (when 
the blog could not be located by the platform, which implies it does not exist anymore).
The imbalance in the rate of these errors between reformist and conservative blogs 
suggests that at least a portion of these reformist blogs which were either deleted or 
not found have actually been taken down for political reasons and the hosting platform 
is not transparent about the motive behind these removals.
FiGure 14. PerCeNTAGe OF BLOGS “deLeTed” Or “NOT FOuNd”
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conservative blogs tend to have a longer lifespan than reformist blogs. In cross-
referencing information on the availability, activity, and political orientation of the blogs 
from the different yearly samples, our data show that blogs supporting reformist ideas 
have a shorter lifespan than conservative blogs.47
If we consider the entire list of blogs, regardless of the year(s) they were present in 
the annual samples, we find that 39 percent of conservative blogs versus 31 percent 
of reformist blogs were still available and active in September 2013. In addition, 38 
percent of blogs from the “other” cluster were still active in September 2013.
FiGure 15. PerCeNTAGe OF STiLL ACTive BLOGS CLuSTer AFFiLiATiON (AS OF 2013)
47 The trend is reversed in 
the 2011 sample, with 43 
percent of reformist and 
38 percent of conservative 
blogs still active in 
2013, which is likely a 
result of our sampling, 
as the 2011 includes 
fewer conservative blogs 
following a redefinition of 
the attentive clusters used 
by Morningside Analytics.
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48 The trend is reversed in 
the 2011 sample, with 44 
percent of filtered and 42 
percent of non-filtered still 
active in 2013. This is an 
effect of our sampling (see 
previous note).
49 The scripts we developed 
to detect removal 
messages were more 
efficient on Blogfa than on 
other Persian platforms. 
Further investigation with 
scripts refined for each 
blog hosting platform could 
produce supplementary 
results.
50 As noted previously,  
74% of blogs in our sample 
are hosted on Blogfa.  
See Part 2 on methodology  
and sample information.
51 These numbers are 
consistent with those 
reflected by the site owner, 
as reported by Small Media 
Foundation: “Alireza Shirazi, 
the founder of Blogfa, 
expressed concerns on 
Twitter about the future of 
the domestic blogosphere 
due to filtering: “Horrible 
events are occurring.  
I receive orders to block 
around or more than 
100 blogs per day. In the 
future, [we won’t] have 
any blogs.” Shirazi has 
previously noted weeks 
where Blogfa received up 
to 600 takedown orders, 
elaborating that they 
are often for offending 
terms related to hacking 
and music.” See “Iranian 
Internet Infrastructure and 
Policy Report,” Small Media 
Foundation, January 2013, 
http://smallmedia.org.uk/
content/62.
Key Findings of Web  
Crawling Analysis
Filtered blogs tend to have a shorter lifespan. Similarly, when we cross-reference 
information on the availability and activity of the blogs from the different yearly 
samples and the frequency of their filtering, the results indicate that filtered blogs have 
a shorter lifespan than non-filtered blogs.48
If we consider the entire list of blogs regardless of the year(s) they were present in the 
yearly samples, we find that 45 percent of non-filtered blogs are still available and 
active in September 2013, versus only 30 percent of filtered blogs.
FiGure 16. PerCeNTAGe OF STiLL ACTive FiLTered ANd NON-FiLTered BLOGS (AS OF 2013)
We also conducted an analysis of the number of blogs that have been taken down by 
blog platforms for violating the law or terms-of-service agreements. As our research 
shows, most removals target blogs hosted on Blogfa,49 which hosts the majority of 
Persian blogs.50 We observe that of the 16,755 Blogfa blogs in our sample, 668—or 
nearly 4 percent were removed.51 The majority of the removals took place between 2011 
and 2013.
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52 In order to collect 
data on blog takedowns, 
we relied on Archive’s 
Wayback Machine, which 
retrieves and stores large 
sections of content on the 
Internet for the purposes 
of maintaining historical 
records, including the blogs 
within our sample.
53 See Small Media 
Foundation, “Infrastructure 
and Policy reports,” January 
2013, http://smallmedia.
org.uk/content/62; February 
2013, http://smallmedia.
org.uk/content/78; 
February/March 2013, 
http://smallmedia.org.uk/
content/82.
Moreover, the blogs removed between 2010 and 2013 had existed for at least four years 
on average, based on their data from the Archive Wayback Machine website.52
FiGure 17. FrequeNCy OF BLOG remOvALS ON PerSiAN WeB HOSTS
In looking closer at the years 2011 to 2013, it appears that blog removals occur 
irregularly. For instance, we can observe a peak in takedowns during the first quarter of 
2013, when authorities were engaged in an intensive online censorship effort in the run-
up to the June 2013 presidential election.53
FiGure 18. BLOGFA remOvALS (2011-2013)
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 Key Findings from Blogger Interviews
our interviews with bloggers focused on the following areas of inquiry:
 the diaspora effect: the impact of relocation
Bloggers we interviewed stress the “diaspora effect,” or the impact of relocation from 
Iran to other countries, as an important factor that modified the relationship between 
bloggers and their audiences. At the start of a blogger’s career, a blogger establishes an 
audience through a particular perspective, style, and language—the blogger’s “particular 
flavor,” as one respondent puts it. Changes in a blogger’s tone and attitude after moving 
from Iran to another country can impact how the blogger is perceived by readers, as 
does the fact that the blogger is no longer in the same place and living in the same 
conditions as a large part of their audience.
For instance, while a blogger in Iran is more to likely to provide first-hand experiences 
of events, those located outside Iran more often rely on other sources of information, 
which can have their own prejudices and biases, according to our interviews. One 
blogger explains how after moving to Europe he noticed a change in his approach to 
subjects that are forbidden or taboo in Iranian society, as well as “subtle, unconscious 
changes that the audience detects and reacts to.”
“ You are not the same person that you were before you left Iran and the audience notices 
this. You are like a product which has changed its flavor and thus needs to market itself 
again and recreate its audience.”
the impact of emigration of many prominent bloggers on the persian blogosphere, 
or the so-called “diaspora effect,” and whether and how this produced changes  
in blog content, readership and relationships with audiences both inside  
and outside iran;
how personal and/or professional issues—including financial and economic 
pressures and career changes—could influence blogging activities;
the influence of state intervention, including both filtering practices and direct 
pressure on bloggers by authorities;
the role of new technologies, particularly social networking sites and  
micro-blogging, in reshaping the interactivity and dynamics of the iranian 
blogosphere;
the impact of changes in the socio-political climate in iran during the first  
decade of 2000 on the persian blogging culture. 
“ 
“ 
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Our interviewees also emphasize how emigration produces a shift in perspectives, which
can result in declines in or changes to blogging activities. On a practical level, relocated
bloggers typically have less time to blog while integrating into a new environment,
for instance. Yet relocation can also mean a change in a blogger’s perception the host
country and the West in general, as well as a shift of perspective on Iran, especially with
respect to notions about freedom of expression and individual rights.
Some relocated bloggers may even change gears by supporting the decisions of the
ruling class in Iran (if they were previously against it), according to surveyed bloggers.
Nostalgia for the homeland and seeking potential opportunities to return to Iran may
may have persuaded bloggers to abandon previous perspectives on certain topics.
Audiences often detect a change in the blogger’s value system and priorities, which
has a significant impact on readers’ continuing interest in the blog. In these cases, the
blogger may be described as “having lost it” or “having turned her back to her own cause
now that she is safe.”
Personal and Professional Issues
Interviewed bloggers indicate that when they first interacted with the Internet in the
late 1990s or early 2000s, they mainly went online for specific purposes, such as to
email or visit a certain website. However, using the Internet as a platform for publishing
content was also among the very first applications mentioned by bloggers with whom
we spoke.
Blogging, except in rare cases, did not provide the necessary economic or financial security,
according to interviewed bloggers. In addition to the time required to maintain a
functional blog, some bloggers maintained self-hosted blogs which incurred additional
costs.
They closed the newspaper. I was still at school and had a small printing business.
I used that income to pay for the expenses of my blog.”
Statements from our interviews with bloggers show that in the early years of Blogestan,
many bloggers were university students. One reason for the proliferation of student
bloggers could be that universities and academic centers were among the first
institutions in Iran with affordable or even free access to the Internet. This also explains
why many bloggers had to reduce their blogging activities as they moved into later
stages of adulthood.
We used to publish a local newspaper in the university that they had just banned and so
we had discussions on what we could do next. My brother used to bring printed hardcopies
of different websites and blogs home. One day he printed a copy of the instructions that
Hossein Derakhshan had written for setting up a blog in Persian. My brother encouraged
me to start a blog. So I did, and I started publishing what I would send out to the
newspaper on my blog as well. These pieces were related to the internal politics of the
university.”
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Bloggers also mention their involvement in more formal online publishing as an 
important factor for retiring from Blogestan. One blogger describes his “ascent” from 
a beginner to a well-known political blogger who was later recruited by online news 
portals based outside Iran.
“ I had to manage two websites and I did not really have time for my own blog.  
The point is that the websites had much greater audience size and capacity than my own 
blog, so I gradually shifted all my efforts to the websites.”
 state influence (i): blogestan -  
 a haven for Journalists and activists
Interviewed bloggers emphasize that state involvement played a key role in the initial 
expansion of Blogestan. External pressures appear to have encouraged many bloggers 
to start their own blog, as Blogestan provided a less-restrictive environment compared 
to Iranian mainstream media, in terms of content and attitude towards the social/
political establishment. 
“ In Blogestan, people talked about the topics in a more relaxed way than in print media  
and in a language which was closer to audiences. The content was both less constrained 
and more informal. Both aspects were rarities.”
Moreover, for bloggers who also worked for more formal publications like local 
newspapers, the restrictions on print media also drove many to invest more time in 
blogging. One blogger working at a local newspaper describes how he decided to “take 
blogging more seriously [because] they were just telling us that we cannot write about 
this or that topic in the newspaper.” Several interviewed bloggers describe blogging as 
an act of resistance against the hegemony of mainstream media, corporate ownership 
and state control of the media and public sphere.
“ Bloggers insist on producing a different point of view, when everything else is harmonized.”
This harmonization meant that the media was forced to comply with restrictive 
conditions and the closure of a significant number of newspapers and magazines. 
Blogestan was one of the few outlets for former journalists. Blogestan in particular and 
the web in general, attracted increased interest from journalists—even though many 
journalists, according to one blogger “did not take Blogestan seriously at the beginning.”
While Blogestan enabled anyone to produce and interact outside the restrictive 
boundaries of the public space in Iran, certain groups converged on cyberspace faster 
than others. For instance, the early years of Blogestan saw a surge of participation 
among female bloggers sharing perspectives on both public and private matters. One 
female blogger points out that women were essentially only represented as mothers and 
wives in traditional media, while in Blogestan, women were less constrained and could 
have an identity outside of these social constructs. As such, Blogestan provided a public 
forum in which females could discuss their perspectives on a range of issues, including 
ideas of sexuality and intimate relationships, according to our interviews.
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Social and political activists were also quick to start using blogs and many of the 
interviewees mention that blogs made it possible to discuss social and political issues 
not allowed in the print media. Direct involvement in activist causes soon became a 
major theme in Blogestan. One blogger recalls how he used Javascript codes to produce 
a timer showing the amount of time that pro-democracy journalist Akbar Ganji had 
spent in prison: “I created the widget and then other bloggers posted it on their blogs.” 
 state influence (ii): crackdown on blogestan  
 and its aftermath
Many of our participants suggest that blogging was a way “to be heard” and that 
they did not have a particular target audience in mind and or an understanding of the 
consequences of their public content. One blogger notes that his complete openness 
about his opinions meant that the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security agents 
were reading his blog, something he only realized when confronted by government 
officials.
“ They showed me a stack of papers, each one a blog post that I had written,  
and they had highlighted portions and sections. After I was released, my blog in effect 
became my case file. I did continue blogging. I would even address my interrogator  
on the blog, and he once called me back to mention that I was making my case 
more dangerous. All in all, the blog wasn’t what it used to be. It wasn’t a channel of 
communication between me and my audience. Unwanted eyes now preyed on my blog  
for what I wrote and for the others who commented on it. It was neither personal  
for me, nor safe for the audience.”
Bloggers in our interview sample report instances in which their friends or family 
expressed discomfort with the content they published, particularly if the blog post 
contained references to sensitive personal or sexual issues. One describes an incident in 
which her partner was extremely displeased about her latest post in which she discussed 
an incident of sexual abuse that happened during her childhood. Another blogger 
describes a post with a sexual undertone that caused tensions with her colleagues. Thus, 
some bloggers interviewed report that they stopped publishing content that was outside 
the normative framework of their social circles.
 
Our interviews indicate that as Iranian authorities began to monitor cyberspace in 
order to trace and spot dissent, bloggers became more aware of issues of security and 
privacy, which lead to changes in their blogging content and activities. One blogger 
suggests that: “more eyes were watching.” Some bloggers in our sample report they 
became more self-aware and rechanneled some conversations into more private online 
or offline spaces. Increased awareness of privacy issues also can be traced to the fact 
that as younger bloggers grew older they became more concerned about the potential 
impact of their blogging activities on their professional careers. One blogger explains 
that after he graduated from university and started his job, he reviewed his blog and 
unpublished several pieces of content. 
Key Findings from 
Blogger Interviews
31
Although several interviewed bloggers emphasize the importance of blogging under 
their real names, the increase in state intervention and scrutiny forced many bloggers 
to “hide behind a pseudonym,” as one blogger explains. Under these circumstances, it is 
likely that some simply opted to stop blogging. Others chose to start a new anonymous 
blog. These bloggers, however, were accustomed to receiving attention and feedback 
from their audiences and their anonymous blog often failed to compete with the famous 
blog and thus, we suggest, bloggers lost interest in working under the new alias. Around 
the same time, social media was on the ascent, and bloggers began to channel more 
sensitive content into private posts on social media platforms. As a result, Blogestan 
lost some of its most significant bloggers as well as some aspects of its iconoclastic 
spirit that had initially attracted audiences.
 impact of social media (i): social networking sites
When asked about how social media and in particular social networking sites (SNSs) 
have impacted their blogging activity, some bloggers stress that the line between SNSs 
and blogs is not as clear as one might think. Another blogger points out that Facebook’s 
Note capability may in the future evolve into a tool that would compete with blogging 
platforms.
“ It is meaningless to insist that a blog must be located on Blogspot or Blogfa. The position 
of the blog does not have significance. We are left with the assertion that blog is a dead 
phenomenon if we signify the historical form of publication. I think blogs have switched 
from the old manifestation, where they were carried in a unique URL, into becoming an 
inhabitant of social media.”
The introduction and further development of SNSs impacted Blogestan in various ways, 
particularly in terms of content production, according to our blogger interviews. From 
a technical standpoint, a blogger has to maintain a healthy and up-to-date installation 
of a Content Management System (CMS), if utilizing a self-hosted blog and a functional 
theme and peripherals, including a FeedBurner connection for example. According to 
bloggers, social media, on the other hand, offers a free, functional blogging platform 
where traffic is guaranteed. Compared to publishing content on a blog, which potentially 
requires a certain level of technical expertise—for example, if the blogger wants to 
embed a YouTube video—social media offers a ready-made and amateur-friendly 
environment with low barriers to participation. 
Interviewees also describe how in the early years, blog content was primarily text-based, 
which meant bloggers became known for their skills in producing written content. SNSs 
have facilitated the use of images and videos, allowing users to quickly post audiovisual 
content that often attracts more viewers. 
“ These days, people get more attention for a picture of their new haircut than what  
we would get back in the years when we posted a blog post that we had spent a significant 
amount of time working on.”
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SNSs also encourage the production of short, pointed, emotionally-charged, and 
“sophisticated-looking” pieces at the expense of longer, more analytical, intellectual blog 
posts. 
“ It does not make sense to write a long blog post, just utter it in a Facebook status update, 
where you are always right because you are vague, and then you will receive a hundred 
likes.”
An interviewee compares SNSs to “fast food,” explaining, “I would spend a significant 
amount of time producing content for my blog and then I would receive one comment, 
whereas I can post a shorter piece on the social media, on which I’ve spent less time, 
and still I’ll get 100 likes and 100 comments.” Other bloggers also point out that novelty 
is a requirement in Blogestan, whereas reusing/reposting available content on SNSs is 
common practice. This puts bloggers at a disadvantage with the rest of social media 
users, as their less frequently updated content is in competition with an ocean of reused 
and reposted content.
Content producers in Blogestan have to rethink the promotion strategies for their blogs 
in light of new possibilities and growing SNS audiences. One interviewed blogger states 
that he shares selected pieces of content as soon as they are published. Another blogger 
created Facebook pages and groups and shares the content of his blog posts in their 
entirety on social media sites. In describing the dramatic impact of such strategies, one 
blogger explains, “People read the post on Facebook and left their comment there. It 
did not make sense for them to do an extra click and write their comment underneath 
the post. As soon as the first comment was posted on Facebook, the rest followed. The 
social media now owned the item.” Following that logic, and taking into account that 
most SNSs dissolve content, which makes content retrieval difficult after time passes, 
the remaining function of blogs from the perspective of bloggers is to “merely be an 
archive.”
“ Blogs have now become the personal archives of individuals. It is a common practice now 
that an individual would set up a blog in order to keep track of his writings elsewhere.”
Bloggers we interviewed report that from the content consumer’s perspective, SNSs 
provide a more homogeneous experience. Buttons and links are always in the same 
location, independent of what content one may be looking at on Facebook, Twitter, and 
Google+. In contrast, every blog has its own theme, locations for links, archive, etc. The 
comment section underneath a post may request the user to enter several pieces of 
information, whereas all these operations are seamless on any given SNS. Additionally, 
many blogs lack a proper mobile version, according to bloggers. The text may become 
unreadable and the images may not scale properly when a blog is browsed on a 
smartphone. With the rising use of smartphones, audiences are understandably having a 
harder time accessing blog content compared to content on social media. Blogs for the 
most part still require a larger display and a keyboard for content production. 
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Audience interaction over blogs is also quantitatively different, according to bloggers 
in our sample. The absence of elements such as “like” and “plus” requires interested 
audience members to type a response, usually requiring approval from the blogger. 
Social media accelerated this process. 
“ Content is delivered to its audience in matters of seconds on social media, something which 
took hours in Blogestan.”
Several bloggers, however, emphasize the positive impact of social media, such as how 
these platforms enable them to satisfy members of their audience who want reactions 
to daily events, or ‘crowdsourcing’ ideas: “I get some feedback and people would add or 
remove from the idea. Sometimes I end up writing a blog post about the idea, which has 
now been ironed out and described more clearly,” according to an interviewed blogger.
 impact of social media (ii): blogrolling.com  
 and Gooder
Interviewees also stress how technological shifts and the closure of popular blog feed 
and feed aggregator services have negatively impacted the Persian blogosphere. The 
blog feed platform BlogRolling was a tool through which readers on one blog were 
alerted when other blogs on the blogroll published new content. BlogRolling.com also 
acted as a kind of currency in Blogestan: the more a blog was added to the blogrolls of 
other blogs, the more this increased its potential readership. Having another blogger 
on your blogroll was as a sign of mutual respect and companionship. According to one 
blogger: “My audience was the same group whose writings I read.[...] I had them on my 
blogroll and they had me on their blogroll.” When Blogrolling.com shut down its service 
in late 2010, bloggers were forced to utilize Yahoo! Pipes, which required more elaborate 
programming. 
“ I knew everyone on my blogroll. Identities were real, not artificial, as they are now.”
According to our sample, blog feeds and feed aggregators were important components 
of Blogestan in a number of ways, and Google’s shut down of Google Reader (‘Gooder’ 
as Iranians called it) in 2013 hit especially hard. These tools removed the need to 
regularly browse individual blog addresses for new content, and many of them were 
accessible on platforms other than a personal computer. Server-based feed aggregators, 
such as Google Reader, functioned as a kind of circumvention tool, allowing their Iran-
based users to read content from filtered blogs, as the aggregation of content was 
conducted on servers outside Iran and was therefore free of the limitations imposed on 
the Internet inside Iran. Feed aggregators also allowed access to blog content outside 
the blog’s template. This way, one was able to read the content of a post without having 
to wait for the entire blog to load—an important feature in Iran’s speed-restricted 
environment. 
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Moreover, bloggers report how they were able to acquire information about the 
readership of their blog through feed aggregators and third-party tools, such as Feed 
Burner, which was used to maintain and groom blog feeds and inform bloggers about 
their feed’s popularity. Google Reader allowed its users to post comments underneath 
aggregated pieces of content and to interact with others. In effect, Google Reader had 
become a private social network centered on blogging and populated by many bloggers 
and mature blog readers. This blog-focused enclave dissolved in the cacophony of social 
media when Google Reader was shut down, forcing content from Blogestan to compete 
against other forms of content, and losing some of its interactive capacities in the 
process.
“ No one really writes a comment anymore, and even if they do, the comments are lost in 
social media. When Gooder was around, that was where the comments would be left,  
and the bloggers would know that.”
The bloggers interviewed also say that the closure of Google Reader and BlogRolling 
disrupted important connections between bloggers, who used to be able to re-route 
some of their traffic to others through their blog roll, thus performing community 
building. Around the same time, the general volume of traffic in Blogestan dropped  
as readers began following links on social media. Re-routed traffic, which served  
as a kind of currency in Blogestan, is no longer as prevalent, which has weakened 
blogger-to-blogger connections.
“ I would post a link to a blog on my blog and the traffic on that blog would suddenly jump 
from 10 to 1,000. This gave both me and the blogger a buzz. I was capable of sending out 
traffic, and this meant that I mattered. On the receiving end there was a blogger who was 
catapulted into fame. Both parties gained something. We do not have this anymore.  
We helped others to be seen and they helped us to be seen. These attitudes are lost now.”
 impact of social media (iii): From sobhaneh  
 to balatarin
Aside from the aggregators mentioned above, other tools played key roles in helping 
Persian bloggers measure and increase traffic to their pages, according to our blogger 
interviews. One blogger mentions that in the first years of Blogestan, Yahoo! Messenger 
was often used to promote their content: “Back in the day, the first thing you would do 
after you published a post was to send the link to your contacts on Yahoo! Messenger.” 
One of the first concrete indicators of a blog’s audience was the number of page visits. 
One blogger mentions his sense of satisfaction when “105 people visited my blog in one 
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day,” but at his blog’s most influential peak, “2,000 or 3,000 people would visit my blog 
every day.” Another blogger states that his “primary” goal in blogging was to have a high 
“counter.” 
“ When I started blogging, the only thing which mattered to me was that my counter should 
grow. It just mattered that the number of visitors of the blog would go up.”
Sobhaneh, a link-sharing service created by Hossein Derakhshan that allowed 
administrators to post links to blogs and other sites, is considered one of the first 
portals for blog content.54 A blogger describes his page visits growing exponentially 
when links to his content were posted on Sobhaneh. Anecdotal evidence indicates that 
prior to the introduction of the major social networks and Balatarin, Sobhaneh was one 
of the most significant platforms on the Persian-language web. One blogger suggests 
that choosing your title in order to attract visitors from Sobhaneh was an art form.
What Sobhaneh had started for Blogestan was continued more aggressively by Balatarin 
which is a key tool for bloggers to promote blog posts and to instantly assess their 
success based on the number of positive (“plus”) and negative (“minus”) votes as well as 
clicks from Balatarin to their blog. One blogger states that “social media gave us new 
numerical criteria in order to measure the size of a post’s audience: number of likes on 
Google Reader and Facebook, how many times the post was shared on the social media, 
and the number of votes on Balatarin. These were quick ways to assess how successful 
a post had been in attracting the audience.”
The competitive dynamics of Balatarin motivated its users to post links that would 
receive as many “pluses” as possible before disappearing among the hundreds of newly 
posted links. One blogger says: “Balatarin gave birth to a generation of blogs which 
produced content for Balatarin. Some of the content only made sense if you were aware 
of what had gone on the day before on Balatarin.” For bloggers wanting to push their 
link onto Balatarin’s “hot page” in order to get a shot of high traffic, the capacity of 
the title and the short description to attract immediate attention of readers became 
more important than the thoughtfulness of content. This process, which we call the 
“Balatarinization of Blogestan,” favored provocative, polemical, and extreme content 
over the thoughtful intellectualism of early Blogestan. This also produced a counter-
movement against Balatarin among some bloggers: the statement “do not link content 
from this blog in Balatarin” can be seen on several blogs at the time of this report’s 
writing.
“ I think Balatarin was one of the most important driving forces for political blogs.  
It has since succumbed to the thrill of controversy, though.”
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Canadian-Iranian blogger, was sentenced to 19 years in 
jail in 2010. He is currently imprisoned in Tehran. 
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 socio-political changes
Interviewed bloggers describe how content produced in Blogestan underwent a 
transition from personal and private matters to essay-style analysis. Bloggers use terms 
such as “a film I had watched,” “an interesting conversation I had with someone,” and 
“my own relationships” to describe the themes of the pieces they published around 2005. 
Later, however, these themes were modified. According to bloggers we interviewed, the 
political climate under President Khatami had a significant influence on Blogestan, as 
many bloggers abandoned their initial, more confessional focus on personal opinions and 
experiences. President Khatami’s two presidential terms (1997-2005) included both the 
rise of the reformist narrative and its collision with the conservative political current, 
politicizing Blogestan. One blogger describes her transition from being a chronicler of 
her own personal experiences into “an analyst of socio-political conditions.” Another 
blogger maintains that it became increasingly “taboo” to discuss “your own pathetic life, 
when students had been beaten up in the dormitory of the University of Tehran.” During 
this critical period of socio-political change, the once prominent topics in Blogestan 
became less popular as audiences demanded more current event analysis, whether or 
not this was the blogger’s primary interest or focus.
In the early years of Blogestan, the podium to discuss off-limits or ignored issues 
was an attractive novelty. Authorities had not yet started filtering the Internet and 
the conversation on the web was essentially uninterrupted. Blogestan had a strong 
monopoly over content on the Persian-language web, according to bloggers interviewed 
for this report. The rise of social media meant that bloggers suddenly had to share their 
audience with hundreds of thousands of new participants who became new content 
producers, impacting bloggers’ sense of being exceptional and motivation to blog.
“ It used to be a big thing to be a blogger. It isn’t anymore. Everyone is talking now.”
One well-known blogger interviewed for this study mentions that during his first two 
years of exposure to Blogestan, he would passionately read blogs but avoid contributing. 
He says: “It took me a long time before I could have the courage to approach the 
Mount Olympus of Blogestan and consider myself worthy of joining it as a producer, 
as opposed to the silent consumer that I was.” This statement typifies how audiences 
gradually transitioned into playing a stronger content production role and contributed to 
the shifts in conversational dynamics online.
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Conclusion: The Future of Blogestan
From its inception, Blogestan has been driven and shaped by changing socio-political 
conditions and technological developments. The early Persian blogosphere flourished 
as an alternative, unregulated space for expression outside the restrictions of 
mainstream discourse as Internet use exploded among Iran’s majority youth and tech-
savvy population. In later years, the Persian blogosphere morphed under intensified 
state pressures and regulations as the spread of new, more streamlined social media 
platforms began to outpace and replace blogs among both bloggers and readers. As our 
research shows, these factors, collectively, have significantly altered the participatory 
dynamics, experimental character and potency of the early Blogestan scene.
These changes raise key questions about the future of the Persian blogosphere. Some 
interviewed bloggers seem pessimistic about Blogestan’s survival—especially as social 
networking sites are reshaping the online ecosystem of the Persian blogosphere and 
beyond. Our data indeed supports the notion of an overall decline in blogging activities 
as well as a high level of blog abandonment since 2008, in part as a result of the 
increase in social networking sites. 
Other facts, however, give a more positive prognosis: nearly all survey participants are 
still reading blogs; hence if there was indeed some change in blog reading habits over 
the years, there is no clear pattern of slowdown in blog consumption. Likewise, many 
bloggers disagree with the “end of history” notion regarding Blogestan and believe 
that cyberspace is young, evolving and prone to new developments. For instance, John 
Kelly, in the Forward of this report, maintains that although external factors did have 
an effect on Blogestan, its overall structure has remained remarkably constant over the 
years, despite a significant turnover and replacement rate among blogs. 
Other bloggers also suggest that Blogestan, to survive, will likely need to abandon 
the now- antiquated, tech-heavy blogging platforms and adapt to new, more efficient 
technologies by integrating, rather than competing against, the advances of social 
networking. To some, it is increasingly evident that the early manifestation of Blogestan 
is no longer a viable model, and that Blogestan’s future depends in part on its ability 
to mobilize the capacities of social networking that are constantly re-generating new 
avenues of communications.
Yet beyond new technologies, Blogestan’s ability to retain its influence and relevance 
within in the socio-political discourse in Iran depends too on its continuing capacity to 
provide dynamic and pluralistic content that nourishes the public sphere.
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Annex: Methodology, Sample  
and Survey Information
methodology for the audience survey 55
The audience survey involved a 27-question survey of blog readers. Most questions 
focused on blog consumption habits and how these have developed over time. Previous 
research shows that there is a significant overlap between readers of blogs and active 
bloggers, which is why we also included five questions targeted at blog readers who 
also have their own blog, in order to observe the development of blogging habits in 
conjunction with reading habits.
The survey was created with Google Forms and then distributed to a vast network 
of bloggers by emailing, Facebook, Twitter, and Google+. The survey was targeted at 
blog users both inside Iran and outside Iran; responses were collected anonymously for 
security reasons. The audience survey did not attempt to cover the whole spectrum of 
Iranian Internet users, blog readers and bloggers, but rather to identify trends within 
Blogestan audiences through a broad sample of users. In total, between July 25 and 
August 8, 2013, 165 people responded to the survey, with the following demographic 
breakdown:
ANNex FiGure 1. SAmPLe demOGrAPHiCS
55 For the full Audience Survey as well as the raw data, 
please contact the authors of this report. 
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Web crawling methodology
To complement the quantitative data of the audience survey, we used automated 
web crawling techniques to better understand the evolution of Persian blogs over 
time. Our objective was to assess the connection between factors such as domestic 
filtering, political orientation, historical trends, or the hosting platform. In order to have 
a benchmark snapshot of a relevant portion of Blogestan dating back to the 2000s, 
we contacted the authors of the “Persian Blogosphere Crawler Report.”56 However,  
the original dataset had been lost following the close-down of the Tehran-based 
organization by the authorities in 2007.
The dataset collected for “Mapping Iran’s Online Public: Politics and Culture in the 
Persian Blogosphere” was on the other hand still available, and the authors of that 
report kindly offered to share it for further study.57 In addition, they also suggested that 
we make the most of similar datasets that had been constituted between 2009 and 
2012, which had not been published.58
Due to the methodology used to select these active and prominent blogs, the size of 
the sample differs according to year and ranges between 6,061 blogs to 9,121. Also, 
it is important to note that these yearly samples overlap for a total of 24,205 distinct 
addresses aggregated across the five measurements, with 2012 being the most unique. 
In the table below we indicate the total number of blogs for each yearly sample, the 
number of blogs present for the first time any given year, and the blogs present in one 
sample only.
ANNex FiGure 2. BLOG SAmPLe
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
TOTAL NUMBER OF BLOGS FOR EACH YEARLY SAMPLE 6,061 8,092 9,121 7,665 7,471
BLOGS NOT PRESENT IN PREVIOUS SAMPLES n/a 2,620 5,715 3,553 6,256
BLOGS ONLY PRESENT IN THIS SAMPLE 574 1,188 3,079 3,357 6,256
Every blog of each yearly sample was attached to a topical category (or attentive 
clusters) using human examination and a computational analysis of the frequencies of 
words and phrases. In the initial report by Kelly and Etling, the categories were: “secular/
reformist,” “conservative/religious,” “Persian poetry and literature,” “mixed networks.” 
This last category gathered blogs focused on sports, celebrity, and minority cultures.
56 Iran Civil Society 
Organization Training and 
Research Center (ICTRC), 
2006.
57 Kelly and Etling, 2008.
58 The datasets gather 
Persian blogs that have 
been identified each year 
as the most active and 
prominent. According to 
John Kelly: “The selection 
of each yearly list involved 
several filters such as 
recentness of publication 
and minimum degree 
requirements. It relies on 
social network analysis, 
not case/attribute data. 
So, this is not sampling. It 
represents the most active 
and connected part of the 
blogosphere, and what’s 
missing is just the poorly 
connected and mostly 
inactive long tail.” 
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In the samples from 2009 to 2012, the number of clusters was increased but meta-
categories remained stable, which allowed us to identify “opposition/reformist/
secular” and “conservative/religious/CyberShia” blogs. To simplify the presentation of 
the findings, we decided to refer to the former group as “reformist” and to the latter 
as “conservative.” We gathered all the other clusters, including Persian poetry and 
literature, and mixed networks, under the label “other clusters.”
Using the datasets presented above, we also collected the following additional data: 
Blog Status and Blog Activity
These traits correspond respectively to the questions “is each blog in our different 
sets still online?” and “what are the dates of the last publications from each blog?” Our 
datasets contained blogs distributed unevenly across seven hosting platforms. Each 
required different approaches to aggregating activity, with user modifications and 
themes creating idiosyncrasies on data collection, even within the same platform.59
Blog Filtering 
Our second data collection endeavor focused on the accessibility of the blogs from 
inside Iran. One limitation of this collection was that no dataset exists that would 
indicate the accessibility of a site in Iran at any given time, limiting our ability to create 
time-series based analysis. Therefore, we could only assess whether each site was 
blocked at the date of the test, at the end of September 2013. In addition, we could 
determine the accessibility of sites regardless of whether the actual site was live or not. 
It has previously been determined that Iran’s web censorship partially occurs based on 
whether the “Host” HTTP header or the page address requested match a blacklist.60 The 
censorship apparatus is agnostic to what the host on the other end actually is and can 
59 To ascertain the status 
of each blog, the script 
first attempted to connect 
to the URL and retrieve 
its front page. Based on 
previous observations, 
this script initially 
checked as to whether the 
content contains strings 
associated with platform 
error messages such as 
those associated with 
site deletion or violations 
of terms of use. The 
script and researchers 
also performed checks to 
determine if the host was 
still responsive or whether 
the domain appeared to 
have lapsed. The status 
values included: ‘not found’ 
or ‘unavailable,’ ‘deleted’ or 
‘disabled,’ ‘empty,’ ‘private,’ 
‘moved,’ or ‘filtered.’ 
While these errors may 
potentially have resulted 
from the same causes, such 
as a blog being deleted 
because it had violated 
the terms of service or 
local laws (otherwise 
coded as filtered), we were 
limited to the attribution 
provided by the platform. 
Therefore, where we could 
not differentiate whether 
a user or authorities had 
removed a blog in the error 
message, we disaggregated 
these cases to treat them 
differently from those 
where attribution was clear.
To evaluate the activity 
of each blog, the script 
first attempted to find its 
RSS feed via an analysis 
of the HTML code of the 
frontpage. If no such tag 
was found, a best guess 
of the location for the 
feed was made based on 
prior observations of the 
blogging platform. If both 
methods failed, then the 
front page and archive 
pages were searched 
for HTML tags identified 
as likely containing 
timestamps for posts. An 
attempt was then made 
to parse potential date 
strings based on Jalil or 
Gregorian date format. To 
allow for the quantitative 
analysis of the result 
of the data collection 
activity, we decided to 
label any blog still online 
as “active” that had least 
five posts published during 
the previous 12 months, 
or that had at least one 
post published every three 
months in the past twelve 
months. We included this 
second criterion in order 
to take into account blogs 
for which we could only 
retrieve data on the overall 
activity per month using 
archive analysis.
60 Simurgh Aryan, 
Homa Aryan, and J. Alex 
Halderman, “Internet 
Censorship in Iran: A First 
Look,” Free and Open 
Communications on the 
Internet, 2013, https://www.
usenix.org/conference/
foci13/workshop-program/
presentation/aryan. 
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be tested through a forged request to a control server. This forged request will trigger 
the same set of filtering rules as if the traffic were directed for the real end destination, 
so long as it traverses the international gateway. This approach allows a researcher 
to send headers to a site that should return a predetermined string in response to any 
request. This test was built on the OONI network interference testing framework.61
Blog Takedowns
Technical limitations on the accessibility of blogs by the filtering apparatus only reflects 
one aspect of the state censorship of Blogestan. Most Persian blogs (92 percent of our 
sample) are hosted on platforms managed by companies established in Iran or subject 
to regulations of the Iranian government, and, therefore, appear to respond to takedown 
requests from Iranian authorities. From the authorities’ perspective, the benefit of 
takedowns compared to mere filtering is that the former cannot be accessed with 
circumvention tools. Additionally, since much of the country’s content filtering occurs 
at the international gateway, platforms hosted in country are not able to be filtered 
directly.62
In order to collect data on blog takedowns, we relied on Archive’s Wayback Machine, 
which retrieves and stores large sections of content on the Internet for the purposes of 
maintaining historical records, including the blogs within our sample. Archive presents 
a “memento” API service, which is a standard that allows for a program to easily move 
between different archived copies of the site. We used this API to detect abnormal 
decreases in the size of successive archives and to spot removal messages on the front 
page of each blog. In doing so, we were able to track down an approximate historical 
period for the takedown or abandonment of numerous blogs hosted on Persian-
language blogging platforms.
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61 OONI developer 
documentation: https://
ooni.torproject.org/docs/.
62 Alireza Shirazi  
(@alirezashirazi),  
“The filtering system 
cannot block domestic 
websites,” 3 June 2013,  
https://twitter.com/
alirezashirazi/sta-
tus/341532866871709696.
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ANNex FiGure 3. FrequeNCy OF BLOG FiLTeriNG ANd remOvALS BASed ON HOSTiNG 
PLATFOrm ANd AFFiLiATiON CLuSTerS
platform total Filtered removed  conservative reformist otherclusters
hosted 
in
ALL 24,205 3,780 704 5,825 4,375 14,005
16% 3% 24% 18% 58%
BLOGFA 16,755 1,100 668 4,435 1,816 10,504 USA
7% 4% 26% 11% 63%
PERSIANBLOG 2,313 154 0 202 566 1,545 USA
7% 0% 9% 24% 67%
BLOGSPOT 1,750 1,721 0 13 899 838 USA
98% 0% 1% 51% 48%
PARSIBLOG 839 44 11 809 7 23 Iran
98% 0% 1% 51% 3%
MIHANBLOG 429 31 18 117 34 278 Iran
7% 4% 27% 8% 65%
BLOGSKY 373 70 1 46 126 201 USA
19% 0% 12% 34% 54%
WORDPRESS 367 352 0 14 285 68 USA
96% 0% 4% 78% 19%
MALAKUT 15 11 0 0 11 4 USA
73% 0% 0% 73% 27%
AKKASEE 10 0 0 0 7 3 Iran
0% 0% 0% 70% 30%
PARSIBLOG 7 0 0 5 0 2 Iran
0% 0% 71% 0% 29%
Myblog 7 0 0 3 0 4 France
0% 0% 43% 0% 57%
PARSIYAR 3 0 0 3 0 0 Iran
0% 0% 100% 0% 0%
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methodology for blogger interviews 63
Bloggers who could be considered influential were selected to ensure they had both 
extensive experience with blogging as well as knowledge about Blogestan in general. 
Selected individuals had to have been active members of Blogestan sometime during 
the past ten year period. They had to have participated in different roles in order to 
assure broad understanding of Blogestan, such as being active blog readers, and have 
experience with social media so as to have an informed view of its impact on Blogestan. 
The list of bloggers to interview was further refined during the selection process, based 
on representativeness and availability, and limited to twenty individuals. Eleven were 
based inside Iran and nine had moved outside the country after they started blogging. 
Eleven of the interviewed bloggers were female and nine were male. Seventeen bloggers 
had continued to blog, however, with different frequencies, and three had stopped 
blogging for different reasons. 
The selected bloggers were contacted through email or a message on Google+ or 
Facebook and interview questions were delivered either over email or through a video 
conversation over Google Chat or Skype. The bloggers were given complete control of 
the time and method of communication in order to satisfy their security requirements. 
The interviews were carried out between June 20 and September 12, 2013. Respondents 
were asked 19 questions covering the Internet, social media, personal context, political 
context as well as additional open-ended questions.
63 For the full interview script as well as an explanation 
of the intent of each question given to bloggers, please 
contact the report authors. 
